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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
IRIS H. STRINGHAM,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
I Case No.
vs.
| 13696
JAMES BRODERICK,
Defendant-Appellant.
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
Respondent agrees with the Appellant's Statement
of the Case.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The case was tried to a jury. The verdict and judgment were in favor of the plaintiff. The jury awarded
the plaintiff $3,327.56 for special damages, $13,488.36 for
lost earnings and $10,000.00 as general damages.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent respectfully requests that the judgment
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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rendered by the lower court be affirmed and that the
Respondent be awarded her costs.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On March 27, 1971, the plaintiff and the defendant
were traveling in separate cars from West to East on
U. S. Highway 50 and 6. The weather was clear but
windy. The roads were dry. About 5 miles northwest
of Green River, Utah, both parties encountered severe
wind storms carrying dust and debris.
The plaintiff proceeded through a small dust storm
which quickly passed. The plaintiff then immediately
entered a second dust storm. This storm reduced the
plaintiff's visibility to virtually zero. In response, the
plaintiff reduced her speed to about 5 mph..
The defendant passed through the first storm and
entered the second storm at approximately 50 mph. The
defendant smashed into the rear end of the plaintiff's
car ramming it forward into the rear end of a third vehicle.
The plaintiff's car burst into flame. The plaintiff's
husband, a passenger, was killed. The defendant pulled
the plaintiff from the burning wreckage. The plaintiff
brought this action as a response to recover some of her
damages suffered in the above-described accident.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE LOWER COURT WAS CORRECT IN
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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REFUSING TO GIVE AN INSTRUCTION
ON UNAVOIDABLE ACCIDENT.
The appellant asserts that the trial judge inadvertently failed to give the instruction on unavoidable accident. That is just not the case. The appellant relies on
the trial judge's statement, "I think that I shall give an
instruction on contributory negligence and also on unavoidable accident and let them mull both of those over."
(Transcript, p. 332, lines 29-30; p. 333, 1.)
This comment came in chambers as part of a discussion of a series of motions to limit the issues to be
submitted to the jury. The comment was made prior to
the presentation of argument by plaintiff's counsel and
consideration of the authorities submitted for plaintiff's
position. The trial judge concluded the discussion in
chambers by referring to one of the authorities submitted
by plaintiff's counsel.
I haven't had a chance to read it yet,
(Wellman v. Noble, 12 Utah 2d 80, 335 P. 2d 66),
this was just submitted to me a few moments
ago just before lunch, and I haven't had a chance
to read it, then I will determine whether this is
a proper instruction. (Emphasis added.) (Tr.
p. 333, 17-22.)
It is abundantly clear that the trial judge's refusal to
give the instruction on unavoidable accident was not inadvertent. It was done on the strength of the argument
and submitted authorities offered by palintiff's counsel.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The heart of the concept of unavoidable accident is
that the accident was of such a nature that it occurred
without being the proximate result of anyone's negligence. The instruction requested by the defendant expresses this same idea.
The law recognizes unavoidable accidents.
An unavoidable accident is one which occurs in
such a manner that it cannot justly be said to
have been proximately caused by negligence as
those terms are herein defined. In the event a ••
party is damaged by an unavoidable accident,
he has no right to recover, since the law requires
that a person be injured by the fault or negligence of another as a prerequisite to any right
to recover damages. J. I. F. U. 16.1.
In Wellman v. Noble, 12 Utah 2d 350, 352, 366 P.
2d 701 (1961), this Court laid out the considerations relevant to deciding whether or not an instruction on unavoidable accident is necessary.
[1] When the error assigned is the giving
or failure to give instructions, the real inquiry
should be were the issues of fact necessary to
be determined, and the principles of law applicable thereto, correctly presented to the jury in
a clear and understandable manner? That is the
purpose of instruction and if it is accomplished,
the failure to give additional ones is not of controlling importance. In this case the court told
the jury in clear and unmistakable language that
there could be no recovery unless plaintiff proved
by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant was negligent and such negligence proxi-

\
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mately caused the accident, which terms were
properly defined and related to the specific acts
of negligence charged. The only possible meaning and effect of this instruction was to advise
the jury that they could not find for the plaintiff, if the occurrence was an unavoidable accident. This is an adequate answer to the plaintiff's complaint about the failure to instruct on
the subject of unavoidable accident.
This statement is controlling in the present case. The
concept embodied in unavoidable accident is that the
plaintiff cannot recover unless the defendant is found
to have been negligent and that his negligence was the
proximate cause of the accident. The jury was amply
instructed in this concept.
Instruction No. 12 clearly carries the same impact.
"The mere fact that an accident happened, considered
alone, does not support an inference that any party to
this action was negligent." Instructions No. 2, 4, 5, and
13 all contribute to this idea that recovery cannot take
place without a showing of negligence on the part of the
defendant. The conclusion is inescapable that the jury
was adequately instructed in the matter of unavoidable
accident and that the trial judge did not err in refusing
to give the defendant's requested instruction.
The facts of the present case also lead inexorably
to the conclusion that the issue of unavoidable accident
is not involved here any more than in practically any
other accident case. The hazardous road conditions
should have put the defendant on his guard that excesDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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sive speed would be dangerous. The defendant testified
that he saw the tail lights of a car through the storm.
He, of course, was aware of the dangers of crashing into
the rear end of another car and the difficulties involved
in bringing his car to a stop "and the consequent necessity of keeping a safe distance and a close watch on the
cars ahead. Thus, there was ample basis to find him
negligent, and only the ordinary indication of an unavoidable accident." Wellman, supra, at Utah 2d 353.
POINT II.

THE AFFIDAVITS OF THE JURORS IN
THIS CASE COULD NOT BE SUBMITTED
TO IMPEACH THEIR VERDICT.
It has been the long standing rule of law in virtually
every jurisdiction that jurors cannot impeach their own
verdict except where special types of misconduct occur.
This Court dealt with the rule of law in Utah at length in
the well-reasoned opinion in Wheat v. Denver & R. G.
W. R. Co., 122 Utah 418, 250 P. 2d 932, 936-7 (1952).
[7] The question first to consider in regard to this alleged misconduct of the jury is
whether this evidence presented to the court,
both the affidavits and the oral testimony, was
competent and admissible. With certain exceptions, a juror's affidavit is inadmissible to impeach the jury's verdict. In the case of People
v. Ritchie, (12 Utah 180, 42 P. 209, 212. See also
Morrison v. Perry, 104 Utah 151, 140 P. 2d 772,
Hepworth v. Covey Bros. Amusement Co., 97
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Utah 205, 91 P. 2d 507), this court adopted the
California interpretation concerning the statutory enumeration of grounds for a new trial, our
former statute having been taken from and identical with their code. The construction involved
is that because the statute enumerated a single
circumstance (chance verdict) where misconduct of the jury could be proved by the affidavit
of a juror, under the maxim "expressio unius,
exclusio alterius", it is implied that in no other
cases could evidence of other misconduct be
proved by such affidavits. Rule 59, U. R. C. P.,
now supplants the statute and is identical, in the
parts here pertinent, with the former statutory
provision except that bribery has been added to
chance verdicts as a ground that may be shown
by a juror's affidavit in seeking a new trial.
The rule prohibiting jurors from impeaching
their verdict is founded on sound reasoning and
has long been recognized. In People v. Flynn
(7 Utah 378, 26 P. 1114, 1116), we said:
"It is well settled that affidavits of
jurors will not be received to impeach or
question their verdict, nor to show the
grounds upon which is was rendered, nor to
show their misunderstanding of fact or law,
nor that they misunderstood the charge of
the court, or the effect of their verdict, nor
their opinions, surmises, and processes of
reasoning in arriving at a verdict."
The policy behind this statement applies
with equal cogency to the oral evidence of jurors proffered upon a hearing of a motion for a
new trial. To permit litigants to get jurors to
sign affidavits or testify to matters discussed in
connection with their functions as jurors would
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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open the door to inquiry into all manner of things
which a losing litigant might consider improper;
misconceptions of evidence or law, offers of settlement, personal experiences, prejudice against
litigants or their causes or the classes to which
they belong. It would be an interminable and
totally impracticable process. Such post mortems would be productive of no end of mischief
and render service of a juror unbearable. If
jurors were so circumscribed in their deliberations, it is likely that judge and counsel would
have to be present in the jury room attempting
to monitor and regulate their thought and discussions into approved channels. Fortunately,
jurors are under no such limitation, but are
allowed freedom in their deliberations. As this
court wrote in Ogden L. & I. Railway Company
v. Jones (51 Utah 62, 168 P. 548, 551, 250 P. 2d
— 59%:
"It is elementary that a juror may not
be heard to impeach his own verdict. * * *
The law, * * * wisely provides that a
juror may not disclose facts which would
go in impeachment of his verdict * * *"
which thought is affirmed by the eminent authority, Mr. Wigmore, who writes, "* * * the
verdict as uttered is the sole embodiment of the
jury's action as such without regard to the motives or beliefs which have led up to their act."
(8 Wigmore, Evidence (1940) 668).
[8] Both the affidavits and the oral testimony offered being incompetent, there exists
no basis for considering whether the jury was
in fact guilty of any misconduct which would
have required the granting of a new trial.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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There are no exceptional circumstances in the present
case that would justify deviation from the established
rule of law. Appellant argues that certain statements
were made in rereading the jury instructions in the jury
room that confused six of the jurors. This Court had
dealt with this type of situation in Cooper v. Evans, 1
Utah 2d 68, 262 P. 2d 278 (1953).
It is suggested that there is substance to the
foregoing contention because when the trial court
advised the jury of the judgment required by
their findings, several members of the jury voiced
disapproval, claiming they had misunderstood;
and that the result was not as they desired.
Upon the motion for a new trial, proof of such
misunderstanding was proffered in affidavit
for. These latter matters, including the proof
by affidavit, were properly disregarded. Jurors
may not thus impeach their own verdict because
of disappointment or even confusion. (Utah 2d
70, citations deleted, emphasis added. See also
Hathaway v. Marx, 21 Utah 2d 33, 439 P. 2d 850
(1968).
It is abundantly clear that the affidavits of five of the
jurors are not admissible for purposes of impeaching the
verdict rendered, nor to show the grounds upon which
the verdict was rendered, or other circumstances surrounding it, and such a rule is applicable to this appeal.
POINT III.
THE TRIAL JUDGE'S INSTRUCTIONS ON
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE W E R E
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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CLEAR AND DID NOT PREJUDICE THE
DEFENDANT IN ANY WAY.
The concept of contributory negligence was given
to the jury in Instruction No. 3. That Instruction was
supplemented by statements in Instruction No. 1 and
by the definition of negligence and proximate cause in
Instruction No. 2. The test to be applied by the jury
was "what a reasonable and prudent person would have
done under the circumstances."
The appellant claims that the trial judge's failure
to give J. I. F. U. Instruction 2.5 was reversible error. The
only difference between the Instruction given and the
J. I. F. U. Instruction is that the J. I. F. U. Instruction
states with particularity what would have constituted
contributory negligence. Appellant claims that by right,
he should have had the jury so instructed. It is clear
from the record what specific acts that were entered into
evidence could have been particularly stated as constituting contributory negligence.
The trial judge asked counsel for the defendant what
evidence there was from which the jury could find contributory negligence.
MR. MANGAN: It may be the circumstance of an unavoidable accident or it may be
contributory negligence. It is a matter which
you may have to rule on as a matter of law, but
I feel that Mrs. Stringham going into a storm
and being in it five minutes and the density
that she had where she couldn't see the car in
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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front of her, the Fish and Game couldn't see the
car in front of them, and to continue to proceed
along at five miles an hour was a situation where
they were opening not only themselves but others
to hazard who may not know what the situation
was. I think that she should have gotten off the
road. I think that a reasonable prudent person
would have gotten off the road, especially where
they had the space that road had.
MR. HOWARD: Well, that isn't a sufficient charge of negligence. She says when she
answered my question she thought it was safer
to go ahead. If the argument were sound that
she were to get off the road or shouldn't do what
she did then everyone on the highway that day
was guilty of negligence. On the other hand, if
we had driven our car or everyone had driven
their car like Mr. Broderick drove his, why the
fish and game people would have been in the
back of the car in front of them, we would have
struck the Fish and Game people going at fifty
miles an hour. (Tr. p. 330,1. 26, to p. 331,1. 20.)
It is inconceivable that the trial judge would instruct
the jury that as a matter of law the plaintiff was negligent if she did not pull off of the road. The only other
possibility for contributory negligence was that raised by
the trial judge. "Now I wonder if she slowed down too
abruptly." (Tr. 332, 1. 2.) As counsel for the defendant
admitted, "We have no evidence as to how she slowed
down other than her testimony and so it is the only thing
available." (Tr. p. 332,1. 7.) It is clear that no evidence
or unreasonable inferences were suggested to the trial
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court that would lead to specific definition of acts that
would constitute contributory negligence.
Notwithstanding the Court's correct action in not
giving any instruction on contributory negligence due to
a complete lack of any such evidence in the record nevertheless defendant's counsel obstinately and erroneously
argued contributory negligence in his closing remarks
to the jury therefore the defendant can't complain inasmuch as he actually succeeded in getting his message
to the jury.
The appellant offers Flippen v. Millward, 120 Utah
373, 234 P. 2d 1053 (1953), as supporting his claim of
error in failing to give the requested instruction. This
case is not controlling nor applicable to this appeal. The
posture on appeal of the Flippen case is the exact opposite
of that in the present case. There, the plaintiff is appealing an adverse judgment on the basis that an instruction
given by the trial court was not warranted under the
facts. The instruction was:
You are instructed that no person shall suddenly decrease speed of a vehicle without first
giving an appropriate signal which would indicate to a driver immediately to the rear that said
vehicle was going to decrease its speed; and if
you find by a preponderance of the evidence that
plaintiff suddenly decreased her speed upon said
highway without giving a signal that could be
seen and observed by a driver in the rear and
that her failure to give such signal in sufficient
time to warn defendant caused or contributed to
the accident and the resulting injuries, if any,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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then you verdict shall be in favor of defendant
on plaintiff's complaint, no cause of action, (120
Utah 374)
This Court held that there was evidence offered at trial
from which the jury could reasonably conclude that the
plaintiff was contributorily negligent.
From the evidence we have outlined above
a jury could have reasonably found that if
both appellant's and respondent's testimony were
true as to the rate of speed their cars were traveling prior to the accident that the accident
could not have occured unless appellant had
either suddenly stopped or suddenly decreased
her speed. While it is true, as contended by appellant that no one directly testified that she
suddenly slowed up without signalling, there is
evidence from which the jury could reasonably
infer that she did so and therefore the court properly instructed as it did. (120 Utah 376.)
Even with the court upholding the action of the trial
court, it did say that the instruction was poor. The trial
judge would have better instructed the jury if he had
phrased his instruction in terms of the evidence;
namely that the plaintiff did not have brake lights on
the car.
Under these circumstances, it would have
been better had the court instructed that unless her car was equipped with a stop light signal which she could and did use it would have
been negligent for her to suddenly stop or decrease her speed. (120 Utah 376.)
This case does not support the position of the Appellant,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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but rather, stands for the proposition that the verdict
and judgment of the trial court should be upheld on
appeal whenever there exists substantial evidence supporting the verdict.
CONCLUSION
The plaintiff-respondent contends that the trial judge
was correct in his instructions to the jury and that the
jury reached a correct verdict. A special instruction laying out unavoidable accident would have been redundant
and would have overly emphasized defendant's version
of the case.
The appellant is incorrect in asking this Court to
consider affidavits of jurors as evidence in support of
impeachment of their verdict. The appellant was not
prejudiced by the trial judge's failure to give J. I. F. U.
2.5. There was no evidence offered that would have justified such an instruction. The appellant had his view of the
case represented to the jury on contributory negligence
in Instructions 1, 2 and 3.
The plaintiff-respondent respectfully requests that
this Court affirm the verdict and judgment of the trial
court.
Respectfully submitted,
JACKSON HOWARD, for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSON
120 East 300 North
Provo, Utah 84601
Attorneys for
Plaintiff-Respondent
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